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This paper studies political accountability under various contractual forms of 
Public Private Partnerships. A critical aspect of any PPP contract is the allocation 
of demand risk between the public authority and the private provider. We show that 
contracts in which the private provider bears all demand risk motivate more the 
public authority from responding to customer needs, since they empower 
consumers, which provides the public authority with more credibility in side-
trading. The policy implication is that the current greater resort to contracts in 
which the public authority retains all demand risk may not be optimal in terms of 
allocative efficiency. (JEL: D23, H1, L5, 017). 
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1   Introduction 
 
Reforming public-service delivery occupies a central position in the current policy 
agenda in the world. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are contracts 
between public and private sector to build and operate infrastructure for public-
service provision, are considered as an alternative model to the traditional public 
provision for public services. They even have been hallowed as a “third way” 
between public provision and full privatization. Being a hybrid arrangement, PPPs 
may in fact dominate both fully public and private provisions by inducing cost 
minimization behaviour by the private provider in charge of the provision while 
reducing potential market failures by limiting the market power conferred on the 
private provider via the regulation through the contract. In other words, they may 
avoid substituting market failures with public failures. 
The fact is that they are now worldwide used. They concern developed 
countries and especially European countries where for instance in the United 
Kingdom they account for 14% of public investment. In the US, 20 U.S. states 
passed legislation permitting the operation of public-private partnerships to build, 
finance and operate toll-roads, bridges and tunnels1. PPPs also concern developing 
countries. A recent report of the World Bank (ESTACHE [2006]) shows that all 
developing countries from the poorest countries of Africa to the richest countries 
of East Asia were at least flirting with the idea of PPP and often wed to it. In 
addition, PPPs concern a broad range of public services: roads, bridges, schools, 
hospitals, prisons, government accommodation, computer systems, Ministry of 
Defence training simulators, and other activities.  
Nevertheless, many concerns have been raised regarding this emerging 
organizational model. The most stringent worries concern the ex post adaptation 
inflexibilities inherent to these long term contracts. Adaptation is important when 
consumers’ preferences change and improved policies or technologies are 
discovered. As the major feature of PPPs is that they are long-term service 
contracts, it is highly likely that contracting parties will be unable to write 
complete contracts that cover all contingencies, and numerous are the cases that 
offer good illustrations of the difficulties for procuring authorities to reaching an 
agreement with private public-service providers on contractually unanticipated 
service adaptations. It is often mentioned that “[a] key concern with long-term 
PPP contracts is the level of flexibility that they offer to authorities to make 
changes either to the use of assets or to the level and type of services offered” 
(PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS [2005, p. 33]). 
So far, studies have explained the ex post adaptation problems by the distorted 
incentives for the private public-service provider to invest in the research into 
innovative approaches to carrying out the service provision (HART, SHLEIFER 
AND VISHNY [1997], HART [2003], BENNETT AND IOSSA [2006]). None of 
them approach this issue from a political point of view; none of them give an 
active role to public authorities. However, public authorities have also an 
important role to play in the adaptation of the private provision of public services 
                                                 
1  See “Paying on the Highway to Get Out of First Gear.” New York Times, April 28, 
2005. 
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over time for the following reasons. First, any PPP is between a public authority 
and a private public-service provider; that is there is no direct democracy (the 
public cannot vote directly to select and oust the private provider). Second, there 
is no market accountability of private providers, since the price applied to 
consumers, if any, is a regulated price, not a market price. Finally, public 
authorities, as elected delegates of consumers, are duty bound to discover 
adaptations and consumers’ preferences and to exercise pressure on the private 
provider to adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective 
consumers demand. It seems then that political accountability, i.e. the 
responsiveness of public authorities to consumers concerns, has also to be 
considered when one aims to tackle the issue of the inefficient development of 
PPPs over time. In other words, we have to consider public authorities as active 
players instead of passive bystanders of the general efficiency of PPPs.  
ELLMAN [2006] theoretically raises the question of how privatizing service 
provision affects accountability of public authorities. Thus, in this paper, the 
tradeoff is between public and private public-service provision, boiling down to a 
control rights issue. By contrast, I investigate how the contractual design of PPPs 
affects accountability mechanism. In particular, a critical aspect of any PPP 
contract is the allocation of demand risk between the public authority (national or 
local) and the private provider. Broadly speaking there are two main contract 
types for delegating public services to private operators: contracts where private 
providers bear no demand risk, hereafter designated as availability contracts, and 
contracts where private providers bear all demand risk, hereafter designated as 
concession contracts2. Both are long-term, global contracts on the design, 
building, financing and operation of a public service and consist in output 
specifications systems. Both contracts can be considered as fixed-price contracts 
(the procuring authority offers the private provider a prespecified price for 
completing the project in both contracts). They do not differ in the magnitude of 
implication of the private operator, both contracting procedures formally delegate 
to the private provider sufficient residual control rights to provide the service free 
of interference. The main difference between these two contractual practices 
concerns the demand risk, which is borne by private providers in the first case and 
by public authorities in the second case. Thus, under a concession contract, the 
private provider’s remuneration depends on the demand for the public service 
whereas under an availability contract, it comes from service payments by the 
procuring authority according to performance criteria (the contract specifies 
penalties in case the performance and quality criteria are not met); there is 
therefore no link with the service demand.  
                                                 
2 IOSSA AND MARTIMORT [2008] distinguish three types of PPP contract, 
depending on whether the payment is based on (i) user charges, (ii) usage, or on (iii) 
availability. In the first case, the private provider bears all demand risk. In the second 
case, the allocation of demand risk depends on the relationship between the payment 
and the actual usage level. In the third case, the public authority retains all demand 
risk. In this paper, I focus only on the two extreme contractual forms but, as it is 
explained in the discussion section, considering a continuum choice of contracts 
rather than a binary one does not question the results obtained.   
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The traditional model of PPPs in the world has been the concession contract. 
According to the World Bank private participation in infrastructure database, 
between 1990 and 2000, overall 65% of the projects in Latin America and the 
Caribbean were adjudicated as concessions. The concession contract is also the 
most common form of PPP in Europe except in the UK, where, even though 
concession contracts are used, public authorities resort above all to availability 
contracts, designated by the acronym PFI “the Private Finance Initiative” and its 
successor the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) (GROUT [1997], HM 
TREASURY [2000]). But the concession contracting model has increasingly 
come under fire in recent times in developing countries as well as in developed 
countries (ENGEL ET AL. [2002], [2006], GUASCH [2004], ESTACHE [2006]). 
The main criticisms are related with the high incidence of renegotiation observed 
under these contracts due mainly to demand overestimation, strategic or not, by 
private providers in their bids (ATHIAS AND NUNEZ [2008]). The trend has 
been therefore to not impose demand risk on private providers anymore. 
Availability contracts are therefore increasingly being adopted around the world 
to move away from the concession model. This is particularly pronounced in 
Europe, where countries have recently promulgated guidelines so as to bring in 
the availability contract as an alternative to the concession contract, e.g. the June 
2004 act in France instituting the new “contrats de partenariat”. 
While it is commonly thought that availability contracts are used when it is not 
possible to make users pay or when the services are not profitable, we observe in 
practice, on the one hand, that some contracts specify that the service provider is 
remunerated according to the service demand even if users do not pay (they are 
most often known under the name “shadow toll contracts”) and, on the other hand, 
that procuring authorities resort to availability contracts, and hence make the 
remuneration of the service provider dependent on continuity of service supply, 
while users pay a toll to them. Thus, it appears that the choice between a 
concession and an availability contract, that is to say between a contract in which 
the private provider bears the demand risk and a contract in which it does not, 
depends neither on the ability to make users pay nor on the profitability of the 
service in question.  
Whereas the literature has been prolific regarding the concession contracts and 
their potential pitfalls, very few have been said about availability contracts. It is 
nonetheless possible to draw some lessons from the experiences in the UK. Over 
900 PFI projects with a capital value of £40bn have been signed in the UK, with 
about 500 of them operational (HM TREASURY [2004]). 
To investigate how the allocation of demand risk between the public authority 
and the private provider affects private providers’ incentives to adapt the service 
provision, and above all, public authorities’ incentives to be responsive to 
consumers concerns, I present an incomplete contract theory model that adds two 
novel features to the set-up of ELLMAN [2006]:  (1) consumers may have the 
ability to sanction and oust the private public-service provider; (2) private 
providers exert efforts to discover adaptations.  
I show that there is a lower matching with consumers preferences over time 
when demand risk is on the public authority than when it is on the private 
provider. In other words, I show that contracts in which private providers do not 
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bear demand risk rule more out the accountability to individual consumers not 
only of providers but also of public authorities than when they bear demand risk. 
The striking policy implication of this paper would be that the trend towards a 
greater resort to availability contracts, or more generally to contracts where 
private providers bear little or no demand risk, so as to avoid the high 
renegotiation incidence observed under concession contracts, may not be optimal.  
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance, so far 
neglected, of the political accountability in the private public-service provision, 
and to shed some insights into the impact of the contractual design of PPPs on this 
accountability mechanism. In addition, this paper also contributes to the broader 
literature on the political economy of government responsiveness. It is in fact 
related to the literature on voucher provision of public services and demonstrates 
that empowering consumers of public services strengthens incentives for 
governments to be responsive.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the basic model of political accountability under both types of 
private provision and solves it. Section 4 extends the model with the 
endogeneization of the effort of the private provider and discusses the 
complementarity or substitutability of public authorities’ and private providers’ 
incentives. Section 5 extends the model with the consideration of the risk of 
default of public authorities, which can occur when the private provider does not 
bear demand risk. Section 6 discusses the results and speculates about the 
application of the analysis to different sectors. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2   Related Literature 
 
My work is linked to the incomplete contract literature, while focusing on the 
contractual design, instead of ownership structures. HART, SHLEIFER AND 
VISHNY [1997] show that if assets are owned by the private sector, then benefits 
that improve service quality require renegotiation and the public body may be in a 
position to extract part of the benefit since the private owner has no alternative 
purchaser for the incremental gain. The effect is that the private owner receives 
less of the benefit of such changes and the incentives are weakened. As a 
consequence, HART [2003] advocates that, where build contracts are easy to 
specify but service contracts are not, then it is useful to have a conventional 
provision (“unbundling” of the construction and operation stages). At the other 
extreme, where service contracts are easy to write and build contracts are difficult, 
the PPP approach may be particularly sensible. BENNETT AND IOSSA [2006], 
in turn, show that PPPs will be optimal only when the innovation in the 
construction stage has a positive externality on operation and maintenance costs. 
In contrast with these studies, I approach the issue of contractually 
unanticipated service adaptation not only from the point of view of the distorted 
incentives for the private public-service provider, but also from a political point of 
view. ELLMAN [2006] is the unique author to our knowledge that theoretically 
raises the question of the accountability of public authorities in private provision 
of public services. More precisely, in this paper, the author compares private with 
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public provision regarding political and public accountability. To this end, he 
relies on the framework of HART, SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1997] but 
considers that the government and the public are involved in service adaptation. 
He shows that privatization can, first, demotivate the government from 
investigating and responding to public demands because privatization allows the 
provider to hold up service adaptations, and, second, demotivate the public from 
mobilizing to pressure for service adaptations, since providers indirectly hold up 
the public by inflating the government’s cost of implementing these adaptations. 
Thus, in this paper, the author tackles the issue of privatization as a shift in 
residual controls. By contrast, I do not compare public public-service provision 
with private public-service provision but investigate how the contractual design of 
PPPs affects accountability mechanism, and more specifically how the allocation 
of demand risk impacts on political accountability. This question is all the more 
important that the issue of whether privatization should take place seems to be old 
as even more countries use PPPs. 
My work is also linked to the literature on the political economy of 
government responsiveness. For instance, BESLEY AND BURGESS’S [2001 and 
2002] model derives how governments become more responsive to people when 
people become more aware of how government actions affect them, which is 
determined by the freedom of the press. Also, BESLEY AND GHATAK [2003] 
tackle the question of the best process by which service providers, consumers and 
procuring authorities come together to create an organization. This could be 
governed by choice, as when a parent picks a school for their child, or by 
government policy. The authors show, in a non formalized way, that empowering 
consumers, by allowing them to choose between providers with different service 
provisions, is a potentially source of welfare improvements. They explain that 
empowering consumers means that the nature of the principal-agent problem 
changes. While the centralized model of public-service provision has two layers 
of agency problems: between consumers and elected officials and between the 
government and the service provider, the structure of the problem when 
consumers of public services are empowered, provides a closer link between them 
and service providers. Thus, empowering consumers can offer a better matching 
between consumers and providers, in other words a greater allocative efficiency.  
This approach underpins the representation developed in this paper of the 
accountability mechanism for service adaptations under the two differing 
contractual procedures. While the centralized model of public-service provision 
illustrated in Figure 1 corresponds to the accountability structure implied by an 
availability contract, the model in which consumers are empowered (Figure 2) fits 
with the accountability structure of a concession contract (or more generally of 
models in which private providers bear the demand risk, e.g. shadow toll 
contracts). As a matter of fact, under concession contracts, consumers are 
empowered to the extent that the remuneration of the private provider depends on 
the demand for the service. Thus, under such contracts, consumers have the power 
to oust the service provider by not using the service any more, depending on the 
availability of alternative options. Making the private provider bear the demand 
risk can then empower consumers, which can then lead to a better alignment on 
service provision preferences.  
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3   The Model 
 
This section presents a simple model of the choice by procuring authorities 
between availability and concession contracts for the provision of a public service 
by a private provider (such as health care, transportation, water, education or 
school dinner catering), derived along the lines of ELLMAN [2006]. I consider 
first the model in which the private public-service provider does not make any 
effort to adapt the service. I endogenise the accountability of procuring authorities 
(politicians) to changing consumers’ demands by introducing a third party (the 
consumers of the public service) within Hart, Shleifer and Vishny’s framework.  
So, in the model, there are two players: a procuring authority PA  (e.g. a 
mayor, local government, or the national government) and the private service 
provider PM  (private manager), and a special third player, the users of the public 
service (the consumers) C, that can influence PA  and PM  but cannot contract 
with them. More specifically, I assume in this model that consumers play a role 
only through their ability to sanction the private provider when the latter bears the 
demand risk. In other words, consumers are considered as a semi-player to the 
extent that I do not analyse the interactions between them and public authorities, 
assuming that public authorities always reflect consumers’ preferences. Such an 
assumption is motivated by the fact that we consider core public services, to 
which consumers are very sensitive, and hence the adaptations they require are 
most often politically salient.  
PA  organises the service provision on the consumers’ behalf. PA  always 
delegates the service provision to a private manager ( PM ), but can choose 
between a contract in which the private provider does not bear the demand risk 
(an availability contract) and a contract in which the private provider bears the 
demand risk (e.g. a concession contract) to do it. Both contracting procedures 
formally delegate to the private provider sufficient residual control rights to 
provide the service free of interference, and they both are long-term contracts (we 
assume of the same length). Nevertheless, under both types of contract, PA  and 
PM  may still need to negotiate to adapt their contract over time. So, ongoing 
negotiation is needed for adaptation in both cases. 
As already mentioned, there is one crucial difference between these two 
contractual forms. Under availability contracts, the remuneration of the private 
provider is not dependent on the demand but stems from service payments from 
PA  according to performance criteria. By contrast, by imposing on the private 
public-service provider bear the demand risk (either through users’ toll or through 
payments from PA  depending on the demand, as in shadow toll contracts), 
concession contracts empower consumers, i.e. make it possible for consumers to 
sanction PM  to the extent that if they do not use the service it provides, the 
private provider’s remuneration is affected. Nevertheless, we cannot speak about 
“direct democracy” in the sense that the contract remains between PA  and 
PM only, neither about market accountability since the the price (or toll if 
consumers pay) paid to PM  for the provision of the public service is the price 
regulated by the contract (not a market price). Thus, under both types of contract, 
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if an adaptation is required, not only the adaptation but also and above all the 
price adaptation will have to be negotiated between PA  and PM . Service 
adaptation can therefore occur only if PA  and PM  reach an agreement on the 
adaptation and the price adaptation. The hope is then that PA  will pressure PM  
to adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective demand. The 
demand/availability distinction matters because it affects what happens when PA  
and PM  have to negotiate to make PM  adapt to unanticipated changes in the 
service provision.  
 
3.1   Benchmark Model 
 
At the start of their relationship, PA  and PM  negotiate a basic contract X , that 
can be either an availability contract or a concession contract. I assume that X  
just compensates PM  for standard costs of provision, whatever the contractual 
design. 
 I do not consider the cost of public funds because, in both contractual 
procedures, the funding can either stem from users’ tolls or from public funds. I 
am only interested in whether the private provider bears the demand risk (in 
which case PM ’s remuneration can stem from public funds as in shadow-tolls 
contracts or from users’ tolls) or not (in which case PM ’s remuneration can stem 
from users’ tolls that are collected by PA  or from public funds).  
 X  generates a (net) payoff of b  for PA  and )(ew  for PM  where )(ew  is 
PM ’s cost advantage (over a standard provider) from investing e  in specializing 
to PA 3. In other words, I assume that this cost-reduction investment e  by PM  is 
fully relationship-specific, i.e. if PM  does not provide some service for PA , 
neither PM  nor PA  gets any benefit from e . I assume that e  is bounded so 
],0[ ee∈ . As in HSV’s model, I assume that this cost-reduction investment is 
accompanied by a reduction in quality )(eq 4. 
The investment e  is not contractible and nor is his payoff implications )(ew  
and )(eq . The following regularity assumptions guarantee sufficiency of first-
order conditions. 
Assumption 1. 0)0( =w , 0)('0)('' ≥∀<< eewew  and 
.0)('lim,)('lim 0 =∞= ∞→→ + ewew ee  
Assumption 2. 00)('',0)(',0)0( ≥∀≥≥= eeqeqq . 
Assumption 3. 0'' >−qw , i.e. the net effect of cost reducing investments is always 
positive5.  
                                                 
3 Since in both contractual designs, PM  has control rights over the service provision, e  will be 
implemented unilaterally. 
4 However, it is not obvious that the quality effects of cost-reducing investments are only negative. 
Nevertheless, considering positive effects on quality of e  will not change the results of our model. 
5 This assumption may be strong but as I assume that e  is bounded, it is not that restrictive to 
assume that this assumption holds everywhere in the domain. It is in fact much less restrictive than 
assuming e  is unbounded and that this assumption holds everywhere, like in Hart, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s and related models. This assumption implies that we consider only public services for 
which PM ’s cost-reducing efforts provoke quality damages that are always smaller than the gains 
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3.1.1   Availability contract: the private provider does not bear the demand risk 
 
Under an availability contract, PM ’s overall payoff is eewt −+ )(0 , where 0t  is 
the payment that PM  receives for the provision of the basic public service. PM  
does not internalise the adverse quality effect )(eq  as quality is noncontractible.  
PA ’s overall payoff is then )(0 eqtb −− .  
 
3.1.2   Concession contract: the private provider bears the demand risk 
 
Under a concession contract, consumers are empowered to the extent that they can 
oust the private provider in case of non satisfaction with the service provision. 
The magnitude of this faculty depends mainly on the availability of alternative 
providers.6 So I use the parameter λ to capture the impact of the pressure 
exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, where ]1,0[∈λ .7 For 0=λ , it is 
not necessary that all consumers switch to an alternative provision to make PM  
experience negative profits. Indeed, the profitability of most concessions contracts 
is very sensitive to the demand, i.e. a marginal change of the demand can generate 
negative profits for the private provider. 
Under such a contract, PM  will then internalize the negative effect on quality 
of his cost-reducing effort according to the value of λ. For instance, if we consider 
the case when 0=λ , PM  would not make any revenue if it does not internalize 
the quality effect of its cost-reducing investment. Thus, in such a case, PM  will 
internalize the full adverse quality effect )(eq . Conversely, if 1=λ , PM  will not 
at all internalize the adverse quality effect of e , since its remuneration would be 
the same whether internalizing )(eq  or not. 
Thus, if the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration is λ, PM ’s overall payoff is  eeqewt −−−+ )()1()(0 λ  
PA ’s overall payoff is then )(0 eqtb λ−− . 
 
 
3.2   Adaptation and Political Accountability 
 
While PM  invests e  to cut costs, PA , as elected delegate of consumers, invests 
effort i  to discover what the consumers want and how to satisfy their demands. 
So i  represents PA ’s efforts to pay attention to consumers concerns about service 
quality. For instance, when there is a consumers’ demand for a concrete change, i  
raises the probability that PA  recognises that the demand is serious and raises the 
                                                                                                                                     
in cost reduction they entail. This assumption seems however to match the features of numerous 
public services for which quality criteria are contractible ex ante.  
6 Note that it is not necessary that the alternative provisions are adapted to consumers’ preferences. 
Consumers can in fact decide to switch to an alternative provision that can even less match their 
preferences, so as to sanction the private provider. 
7 This boils down to assuming that the demand shock of an adaptation can only be negative. In 
other words, we assume that private providers’ remuneration is bounded and can only be reduced 
by the changing demand. 
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probability that PA  works out how to satisfy consumers demands – in terms of 
pressure exercised on PM  to satisfy the change in effective consumers demand 
for instance. This effort permits then PA  and PM  to adapt the basic contract X  
to changing consumers’ preferences.  
I assume that consumers pressure is independent of PA ’s attentiveness and 
contractual design.8  
I denote the corresponding adapted contract by Z , again with the non-
contingent transfer set to just compensate the standard cost of provision. For 
simplicity, I assume that e  helps PM  to satisfy Z  so that PM ’s net payoff from 
enforcement of contract Z  is again )(ew . In other words e  reduces PM ’s costs 
by the same amount whether providing the basic or the adapted service. I also 
assume that e  has the same adverse effect on quality )(eq  whether providing the 
basic or the adapted service. PA ’s additional surplus from Z  is )(iv  where 0≥v , 
increasing and concave in i , represents the net gain in consumers welfare from 
the adaptation. In other words, )(iv  measures PA ’s success in identifying or 
discovering adaptations that are valued by consumers9. So )(iv  can be interpreted 
as a measure of PA ’s responsiveness to consumers demand – how likely it is that 
PA  manages to please consumers. Attentiveness i  raises PA ’s ability and 
propensity to respond.  
If PA  pays PM  subsequent transfers (or toll increases) t  in case of 
adaptation, then, normalizing time discounting to zero, PA  and PM ’s overall 
payoffs from Z  are: 
When PM  does not bear the demand risk 
itiveqtbuPA −−+−−= )()(0  
eewttuPM −++= )(0  
When PM  bears the demand risk 
itiveqtbuPA −−+−−= )()(0 λ  
eeqewttuPM −−−++= )()1()(0 λ  
The investment i  is not contractible and nor is its payoff implications )(iv . The 
following regularity assumption guarantees sufficiency of first-order conditions. 
Assumption 4. 0)('0)('',0)0( >∀<<= iivivv  and 
.00)('lim,)('lim 0 ≥∀=∞= ∞→→ + iiviv ii  
                                                 
8 I neglect the effort investments of consumers to discover improved policies and technologies 
because ELLMAN [2006] already models the public’s role in creating accountability and proves 
that private providers indirectly holdup consumers by inflating the procuring authority’s cost of 
implementing these adaptations. Thus, the higher the hold-up of the procuring authority’s gains 
from adaptation, the lower the pressure of consumers. Considering consumers’ effort will therefore 
not change the results but will strengthen the dominance of the contract for which the procuring 
authority’s incentives are higher. In addition, we can consider that consumers have always binding 
time and budget constraints. 
9 If we consider that procuring authorities are not benevolent and then have for only objective the 
maximisation of their re-election chances, the adaptations required by consumers will have to be 
also politically salient. Again, I do not consider the case when consumers’ and public authorities’ 
benefits from adaptation are not proportional to the extent that I consider core public services, to 
which consumers are very sensitive.  
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Parties are risk-neutral and PA  has rational expectation about the 
renegotiation process when it makes its investments, i.e. it can make correct 
calculations about the expected returns from any action. I assume information is 
symmetric and PM  and PA  negotiate a symmetric Nash bargain.10 So Z  is 
enforced in equilibrium. Contractual design and the availability of alternative 
providers matter because they affect default outcomes in bargaining and hence the 
equilibrium choices of i  and e . I capture these effects in a simple four-stage 
model.  
Timing: 
Stage 1: PA  chooses the contract design (Concession contract, 
Availability contract) for contract X  and negotiates with PM  over stage 
4 contract X, fixing the basic remuneration of the service provider 0t . 
Stage 2: PA  and PM  sink their investments i  and e . I assume for now 
that the private provider does not invest in the research into innovative 
approaches to carrying out the service provision; this assumption is 
dropped in Section 5. 
Stage 3: Renegotiation takes places to allow the adaptation to be 
implemented in the service provision: PA  and PM  negotiate over stage 4 
the contract Z  and additional transfer t  (or toll increases). 
 Stage 4: PA  and PM  trade (jointly or with their market alternatives). 
The remuneration 0t  agreed at stage 1 cannot depend on observed 
investments, for it is not possible to specify in advance the delivery of a specific 
adaptation. So it plays no role in determining investment efficiency. The 
subsequent transfer t , negotiated on top of contract Z at stage 3, is the share of 
PA ’s adaptation surplus that PA  in equilibrium has to give to PM , in excess of 
its adaptation costs. It depends on the stage 3 default payoffs which in turn depend 
on the contractual design and availability of alternative providers, as I will show. 
PM  is assumed to maximize its profits. PA  maximizes the social benefit, net 
of the payment to PM . In this setting, the first-best levels of investments ( **,ie ) 
maximize eeqewiivb −−+−+ )()()( . Hence, they satisfy 
1*)(' =iv  
1*)('*)(' =− eqew  
with **,ie >0. 
As both contracts are with a private provider, in default of renegotiation, I 
assume that PA  is not able to exploit entirely investments i . This is due to the 
fact that under each type of contractual design, PA  and PM  commit to X  at 
stage 1, they cannot therefore switch to alternative trades (except if they break the 
contract, which is prohibitively expensive). PA  might however still engage in 
                                                 
10 Thus, following HART-SHLEIFER-VISHNY [1997], I assume that the public authority does 
not maximize the global surplus during renegotiations: its utility function is given by the welfare 
of the rest of society, excluding the private operator. A justification for this is that the political 
process aligns the public authority’s and society’s interests (since the private operator has 
negligible voting power, his interests receive negligible weight). Of course, if the government 
placed the same weight on the private operator’s utility as on the rest of society, the first-best 
could be achieved. 
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“side-trades” with other private or public providers 'PM  to provide the service 
adaptation alongside the basic public service provided by PM  (this might be 
possible either through the implementation of a new provider, or through the 
resort to already available alternative provisions).11 Nevertheless, this market 
access by PA  is rarely so effective: (1) PA  may not be able to credibly duplicate 
the basic service by buying the adapted service from 'PM  unless the additional 
value from adaptation is very high; (2) even when it is technologically feasible to 
have 'PM  provide the adaptation service without the basic service, this would 
waste the economies of scope from having a single party provide and coordinate 
them. To capture PA ’s reduced market access, I assume that PA  only 
appropriates a fraction )1( k− of the adaptation return )(iv 12, where ]1,0]∈k  
captures the “market-shielding” effect of PPP. This actually boils down to an 
asset-specificity effect. In addition, PM ’s side-trading returns are independent of 
i  and e , so I normalise PM ’s additional side-trade value to 0. 
 
 
3.2.1   Effort when the private provider does not bear the demand risk 
 
Under an availability contract, PA ’s default payoff is:  
)()()1(0 eqivktb −−+−  
Normalizing PM ’s alternative payoff to 0, PM ’s default payoff is )(0 ewt + . 
This is due to the fact that the contract protects PM ’s cost-reduction efforts, by 
forcing PA  to pay a fixed price for the basic service, provided that performance 
criteria are met. So PM  appropriates the full cost reduction )(ew .  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore )(ikv .  
PA  and PM ’s renegotiation gains are ½ of this sum. So PA  chooses i to 
maximise 
[ ] iikveqivktb −+−−+− )(21)()()1(0     (1) 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
[ ] eikvewt −++ )(21)(0            (2) 
The first-order conditions are now 
                 (3) 
 
 
 
3.2.2   Effort when the private provider bears the demand risk 
 
When the contract imposes the demand risk on the private provider, in case of non 
adaptation, consumers can sanction the private provider. The magnitude of this 
faculty depends on the availability of alternative providers (in the case of a 
                                                 
11 I assume that 'PM ’s additional cost of providing the adapted service is the same as for PM . 
Furthermore, I assume competition is such that PA  needs only to compensate 'PM ’s costs. 
12 Recall that )(iv  is PA ’s net benefit, i.e. entails PM ’s costs of adaptation.   
1)(' =ew
k
iv −= 2
2)('
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highway, we can imagine that users, if their changing demand is not satisfied, can 
sanction the private provider by using another road, or by taking the train etc. See 
also the above example with school catering). So, again, I use the parameter λ to 
capture the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration, with the availability contract being equivalent to the setting 1=λ 13. 
Under such a contract, PA  has more power and credibility to exploit 
investments i . In fact, consider that the number of consumers that switch to an 
alternative provider in case of default of renegotiation is such that 0=λ , 
implying no profits for PM . In such a case, PA  is able to appropriate the full 
margin return )(iv  by negotiating with 'PM  (no market-shielding effect any 
more) because PA  is able to switch – instead of side-trading – to alternative 
trading. Thus, if the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration is λ, PA ’s default payoff is 
 
)]1(1)[()()1()]1(1)[()())1()1(( 00 λλλλλλλλλ −−−−+−=−−−−+−+− eqivktbeqivktb
 
In default of renegotiation, PM  may not appropriate the full cost reduction )(ew . 
This is due to the fact that consumers will switch to alternative provisions, which, 
in the case of a concession contract, will lead to lower profits for PM , and hence 
a weaker internalisation of )(ew  by PM . In addition, PM  may also suffer from 
the adverse effect on quality )(eq  of the cost reduction effort e , but, in case of 
default, only regarding the consumers that still use the service even if it is not 
adapted. PM ’s default payoff under a concession contract is then 
)]()1()([ 0 eqewt λλ −−+  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore  
)()1()( ewikv λλ −+   
The gain from renegotiation is shared between the parties through a Nash-
bargaining solution, so PA  chooses i  to maximize 
 
      (4) 
 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
 
          (5) 
 
The first-order conditions are now 
          (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 I abstract from the transaction costs of designing an availability contract compared to a 
concession contract, which when λ = 1 would favour the concession contract. See the discussion 
part. 
1
2
)1(
)1(2)(')(' +=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−− λλ
λλeqew
k
iv λ−= 2
2)('
[ ] iewivkeqivktb −−++−−−−+− )()1()(
2
1)]1(1)[()()1(0 λλλλλλ
[ ] eewivkeqewt −−++−−+ )()1()(
2
1)]()1()([ 0 λλλλ
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3.3   Accountability and Incentives Comparisons 
 
3.3.1   Political accountability 
 
The above first-order conditions demonstrate how a contract in which the private 
provider bears the demand risk increases PA ’s incentives to support adaptations 
from the marginal incentive 2)2( k−  of )(' iv in equation 3 to 2)2( kλ−  of )(' iv  
in equation 6. Under an availability contract, PM  is able to hold up PA  of its 
investments i , because PA  is not totally able to exploit i  by replacing or 
sidelining an uncooperative PM . Under a concession contract, PM  can also be 
able to hold up PA , but it will depend on the value of λ. More specifically, the 
greater the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration, i.e. the smaller λ, the smaller the renegotiation surplus for PA , so 
the smaller the holdup of PM  of PA ’s adaptation investments. In the case of 
0=λ , PA ’s incentives to support adaptations when the private provider bears 
the demand risk, are equivalent to the first-best incentives level. Accordingly, 
)(),(* ACtyContractAvailabiliCCContractConcession iii ≥≥ λ  for any λ. The following proposition 
records these points. 
Proposition 1. Procuring authorities are more attentive and responsive to 
consumers demand when the private provider bears the demand risk. 
Increasing the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration increases the political accountability. So, ACCC ii >)(λ 1<∀λ , 
and                         0>∀λ . 
 
Proof. See Appendix  
 
The proposition, illustrated by the following Figure 1, states that the model in 
which the private provider bears the demand risk (like in concession contracts) 
always dominates the model in which the private provider does not bear any 
demand risk (like in availability contracts) regarding the political accountability, 
i.e. regarding the incentives given to the procuring authority to invest efforts to 
pay attention to consumers changing demands. Intuition follows from the fact that 
the procuring authority has more credibility in side-trading under a concession 
contract than under an availability contract, since the incumbent private provider 
can experience negative profits. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of equilibrium levels of political accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0)( <λ
λ
d
diCC
 
1 
iACi  *i  
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2  
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3.3.2   Private provider’s cost-reducing incentives 
 
The above first-order conditions also demonstrate how a concession contract 
decreases PM ’s cost-cutting incentives compared to an availability contract. As a 
matter of fact, the model shows that for λ equal to 1, PM ’s cost-cutting 
incentives under a concession and under an availability contract are equivalent 
and over-optimal. However, when λ tends towards 0, PM ’s cost-cutting 
incentives under a concession contract, CCe , tend to be smaller than under an 
availability contract. They may become exactly equal to *e  for some λ and then 
continue to decrease and get further away so that, for a range of values of λ, there 
is under-investment in e  under a concession contract. Finally, CCe  may be, for λ 
close to zero, further away from *e  than ACe is. The following Figure 2 and 
proposition illustrate and record these points. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of equilibrium levels of private providers’ cost-
reducing incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 2. i) The private public-service provider’s incentives to invest in 
cost-reducing efforts are smaller when it bears the demand risk than when it 
does not, i.e. CCAC ee ≥  for any λ. Whether the private provider bears the 
demand risk or not is optimal depends on the value of λ and on the functional 
forms for )(ew  and )(eq . Without making further assumptions about the 
functional forms for q(e) and w(e), it is not possible to pin down a particular 
value of λ that makes the contractual forms equally inefficient. 
ii) Increasing the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration, i.e. a smaller λ, decreases its incentives to invest in cost-
reducing efforts, i.e.      
                                  
 
 
 
Therefore, when       , there is a unique value of λ* for which the two 
contractual forms are equally distant from the first best for each form for 
4
10)( >∀> λλ
λ
d
deCC
 
*e  
'' qw −  
CCAC ee 1== λ  CCe 0=λ  
2 
1 
'w  
e  
4
1>λ
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)(ew  and )(eq . Below this cut-off λ*, the contract in which the private 
provider does not bear the demand risk is optimal, and above this cut-off, the 
contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is optimal.  
iii) Since CCAC ee ≥  and )(λe  is increasing              , there is a range of 
values of λ around 1 where the contract in which the private provider bears 
the demand risk is always closer to the first best than the contract in which the 
private provider does not bear the demand risk. 
 
Proof. See Appendix  
 
Intuitively, if the private provider bears the demand risk, it internalizes the 
negative externality of e  according to the potential impact of the consumers’ 
pressure on its remuneration. By contrast, under an availability contract, in case of 
adaptation or not, PM  never internalises the adverse quality effect. Then, PM ’s 
cost reducing efforts under a concession contract can only be lower than under an 
availability contract.  
 In addition, the greater the impact of consumers’ pressure on PM ’s 
remuneration, the more PM  will internalize the negative externality and then the 
smaller e ; conversely, the lower the potential impact of the pressure exercised by 
consumers on PM ’s remuneration, the lower the internalisation by the private 
provider of the adverse effect on quality of its cost reducing investments and 
hence the higher its cost reducing efforts.  
However, this does not imply that the concession contract always dominates 
the availability contract. As a matter of fact, if λ tends towards zero, there is 
under-investment in e  under a concession contract, and for λ close to zero, 
depending on the functional forms for )(ew  and )(eq , PM ’s cost-reducing 
incentives when it bears the demand risk might be further away from *e  than 
when it does not bear the demand risk. This is due to the fact that in case of non-
adaptation and λ close to zero, PM  will not be able to internalize )(ew .  
The fact that PM  may not be able to appropriate the full )(ew  in case of 
default of adaptation when it bears the demand risk explains why availability 
contracts will be always more optimal than concession contracts if we do not 
consider the effect of cost-reducing efforts on quality (since under an availability 
contract, in case of adaptation or not, PM  always appropriates the full cost-
reduction effort).  
 
The consequence is that clear-cut results are not obtained when we consider 
the adverse effect of e  on quality. Whether the private provider bears the demand 
risk or not is optimal depends on the functional forms for )(ew  and )(eq . Thus, 
without making further assumptions about the functional forms for )(ew  and 
)(eq , it is not possible to pin down a particular value of λ, λ*, that makes the two 
contractual forms equally inefficient. However, for a particular form for )(ew  and 
)(eq , it is easy to pin down the λ* that makes the two contractual forms equally 
inefficient. The following Figures 5 and 6 give also an illustration of the 
4
1>∀λ
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situations where a contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is 
either always optimal (Figure 5), or not always optimal (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 5: Case where the concession contract is always optimal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, we have eew 2)( =  and                  (then the assumptions are 
satisfied for all 4<e ). We have then              (blue line), 1=ACe  (red line),                                    
 
                          (yellow line). Then, for all λ , the concession contract is closer to  
 
efficiency than the availability contract. 
 
Figure 6: Case where the concession contract is not always optimal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the case where the concession contract is not always optimal, let 
consider eew =)(  and              . We can see that for smaller values of λ, the 
concession contract is farther from the first-best than the availability contract. In 
particular, the λ* that makes the two contractual forms equally inefficient is 
approximately 0.355569. 
In addition, these figures illustrate the fact that there is a range of values of λ 
around 1 where the contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is 
always closer to the first best than the contract in which the private provider does 
not bear the demand risk.  
In sum, I have shown that it is always optimal to impose the demand risk on 
the private provider regarding the incentives given to procuring authorities to be 
2
)( eeq =
9
4* =e
)²2(
1
λ−=
CCe
2
²)( eeq =
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accountable. As for the incentives given to the private provider to reduce costs, 
there are cases (depending on the impact of the consumers pressure on the private 
provider’s remuneration and on the functional forms for the positive and negative 
effects of the private provider’s cost-cutting efforts) where the contract form such 
as the concession contract does not dominate the contract form such as the 
availability contract. In such cases then, a tradeoff occurs between imposing on 
the private provider the demand risk to raise the accountability and responsiveness 
of procuring authorities to consumers concerns, and not imposing on the private 
provider the demand risk to raise its cost-cutting incentives. Otherwise, when the 
conditions for such cases are not satisfied, the model in which the private provider 
bears the demand risk always dominates the model in which it does not.  
 
 
4   Endogenous Private Provider’s Effort in Quality 
 
So far, I have neglected PM ’s potential role in discovering adaptations whereas 
many studies have highlighted the importance of PM ’s incentives to invest in the 
research into innovative approaches to carrying out the service provision (e.g. 
HART, SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1997], BESLEY AND GHATAK [2001], 
HART [2003], BENETT AND IOSSA [2006]).  
If we consider that it is not in PM ’s interest to implement a quality 
innovation without renegotiating with PA  over the split of the surplus generated 
by such an innovation, i.e. if we assume that PM  has no private gains from 
implementing the adaptation, PM ’s adaptation incentives would not vary with 
the contractual design structures I analyse.  
However, if we now relax the assumption that PM  has no private gains from 
implementing an adaptation, the contractual design may have an impact on PM ’s 
adaptation investment incentives. 
 
4.1   PM ’S Adaptation Effort under an Availability Contract 
 
Under an availability contract, it is straightforward that PM  has no incentives to 
support the cost of adaptation efforts without negotiating with PA  over the 
surplus sharing. This is due to the fact that the remuneration of PM  under an 
availability contract is fixed, provided that PM  meets the quality and 
performance criteria included in the contract, so that PM  receives no private 
gains from implementing the adaptation.   
 
4.2   PM ’S Adaptation Effort under a Concession Contract 
 
Under a concession contract, if PM  invests in adaptation effort j  without any 
negotiation with PA  over the surplus generated by such an investment, PM ’s 
payoff is 
 jeqewt −−−+ )()1()(0 λ . 
If PM  does not invest in adaptation effort and then does not adapt the service 
according to consumers’ demand, his payoff is [ ])()1()(0 eqewt λλ −−+ . In fact, 
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in default of adaptation, consumers will switch to alternative adapted provisions 
whenever possible, which, in the case of a concession contract, will lead to lower 
profits for PM .  
PM ’s maximal gain from adaptation is 
therefore [ ] jeqewt −−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ . 
Thus, since PM has control rights, it will implement the adaptation whenever 
it receives private gains from doing so, i.e. whenever the following condition is 
met [ ] jeqewt >−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ      (7) 
This condition implies that, if the demand shock (e.g. taste shock), reflected by λ, 
is large (i.e. λ tends towards 0) and that the corresponding cost shock, reflected by 
j , is small (i.e. j  tends towards 0), then PM  will have incentives to support j  
without any negotiation with PA  over the surplus generated by his investment, 
because it will receive private gains from doing so. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. If [ ] jeqewt >−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ , i.e. if the demand shock 
tends to be  large and the cost shock of the adaptation tends to be small, then 
the private provider has more incentives to invest in adaptation efforts under a 
concession contract than under an availability contract. 
 
This proposition is consistent with existing evidence on how concession 
contracts are working. For example, the main private concessionaire of highways 
in France has implemented a new radio station in order to offer better real-time 
information to users on the traffic, without renegotiating with the government any 
toll adaptation. While interviewing this private provider, it admitted that he had 
incentives to implement the innovation because the cost of the implementation 
was low and the consequent impact on demand could be large so that it expected 
private gains from doing so. 
This proposition shows that when the private provider bears the demand risk, 
it can have, under certain conditions, a direct accountability to consumers; that is 
even if the contract remains between the procuring authority and the private 
provider, some market accountability is feasible.  
 
4.3   Complementarity and Substitutability in Accountability 
 
The model shows that, under certain conditions, a concession contract increases 
both PA ’s accountability and PM ’s incentives regarding non anticipated service-
provision adaptation. The question that is raised now is to know whether these 
efforts are complementary or substitutes. In fact, it could be useless to speak about 
political accountability if PM ’s incentives could be enough to make PM  adapt 
the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective consumers demand.  
First, the model shows that when the demand shock of an adaptation is small 
and the corresponding cost shock is large, PM does not receive any private gains 
from implementing the adaptation, i.e. it will not have any incentives to 
implement the adaptation unilaterally. In such a case then – which is most often 
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the case, PM  and PA  will have to renegotiate the contract and a greater PA ’s 
accountability increases the probability that the adaptation implemented will 
please consumers.  
Second, even when the conditions that make PM  adapt the service 
unilaterally when it bears the demand risk are satisfied, PA ’s accountability and 
PM ’s incentives can be complementary. As a matter of fact, even if there is no 
renegotiation over whether to implement the adaptation since PM  will implement 
the adaptation without any further inducement, PA  and PM  can communicate 
over the adaptation itself (e.g. over the actual change in consumers preferences) 
because a better knowledge by PM  of the consumers preferences can increase 
PM ’s private gains. In such a case, the greater is PA ’s attentiveness, the more 
sense it makes for PM  to investigate how to satisfy consumers demand. 
Conversely, the greater PM ’s efforts, the more PA  can gain from investigating 
consumers concerns and being responsive to them. Thus, some degree of 
complementarity can be present and hence the model in which the private 
provider bears the demand risk can even more dominate the model in which it 
does not bear the demand risk, as highlighted by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. If political accountability and private public-service provider’s 
efforts in adaptation are complements, then this complementarity raises the 
benefit from imposing the demand risk on the private provider. It has no effect 
on e. 
 
 
5   Demand Risk or Default Risk 
 
So far, we have considered that the payments from PA  to PM , provided that 
performance criteria are met, are guaranteed when the private provider does not 
bear the demand risk. But this absence of “demand risk” under contracts such as 
the availability contract could be an illusion. As a matter of fact, the payments to 
PM  depend on PA ’s budget, i.e. on the capacity of PA  to pay. So we can 
imagine that in periods of tiny budgets, PA  might have some problems to pay 
PM  when the latter does not bear the demand risk14. We can expect that the 
likelihood of such a default risk will be higher in less developed countries than in 
developed countries. Nevertheless, when procuring authorities are local entities, 
such a risk can occur whether the country is wealthy or not (e.g. the city of 
Angoulême in France that went bankrupt in 1991, and was then unable to honour 
any of its commitments). 
So let consider now the possibility of a default risk when the private provider 
does not bear the demand risk. In particular, I use the parameter γ  to capture the 
probability of the absence of procuring authorities’ default risk, with [ ]1,0∈γ 15. 
                                                 
14 I consider in this section that when the private provider bears the demand risk, his payments do 
not depend on the procuring authority’s budgets (it means that I exclude from the analysis the 
shadow toll contracts).  
15 Thus, when 1=γ ,  it means that the likelihood of procuring authorities’ default risk is equal to 
zero and, conversely, when 0=γ , the likelihood of default risk is equal to one. 
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While this parameter might affect PM ’s cost-reducing incentives, it will not have 
any impact on the political accountability. Therefore, repeating the exercise of the 
section 4 and focusing on PM ’s cost-reducing incentives, we have PA  and 
PM ’s overall payoffs from Z : 
iiveqttbuPA −+−+−= )()()( 0γ  
eewttuPM −++= ))(( 0γ  
PA ’s default payoff is then )()1()(0 ivkeqtb −+−− γ  
PM ’s default payoff is ))(( 0 ewt +γ  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore )(ikv .  
PA  and PM ’s renegotiation gains are ½ of this sum. So PM  chooses e  to 
maximise 
[ ] eikvewt −++ )(21))(( 0γ       (8) 
The first-order conditions is now 
          (9) 
The above first-order condition demonstrates how an availability contract 
decreases PM ’s cost-cutting incentives compared to a concession contract when          
     . As a matter of fact, the model shows that for γ  equal to   , PM ’s cost- 
 
cutting incentives under an availability contract are equivalent to the ones under a 
concession contract for 0=λ  and under-optimal. However, when γ  tends 
towards 0, PM ’s cost-cutting incentives under an availability contract tend to be 
smaller than under a concession contract, since the effort of the private provider 
under an availability contract is increasing inγ . So we need λ* to increase so as to 
rebalance the two contractual forms. As this process continues and γ  gets small, 
λ* gets high, and hence the concession contract tends to be more often optimal. 
 
When               , the efforts under a concession contract can be superior or 
inferior to the efforts under an availability contract. More specifically, the 
concession contract will be more optimal for intermediate range of values of λ, 
whereas for extreme values the availability contract will be more optimal.  
This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. For          , as the likelihood of default risk of public authorities 
gets high, i.e. γ  gets small,   λ* is weakly increasing, i.e. the contract in which the 
private provider bears the demand risk tends to be more often optimal.  
In addition, increasing the likelihood of PA ’s default risk, i.e. a smallerγ , 
decreases PM ’s incentives to invest in cost-reducing efforts.  
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
Intuitively, if the private provider bears the risk of default of the procuring 
authority, it may not be able to internalize the positive effect of e . More precisely, 
the higher the likelihood of default of the procuring authority, the less PM  will 
internalize the positive effect and then the smaller e ; conversely, the lower the 
1)('* =ewγ
2
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2
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likelihood of default of the procuring authority, the greater the internalisation by 
the private provider of the cost savings of its cost reducing investments and hence 
the higher his cost reducing efforts. PM ’s efforts are then increasing in γ . 
In sum, considering the potentiality of default of procuring authorities tends to 
make the concession contract be more often optimal than the availability contract, 
under certain conditions, regarding the cost-cutting incentives of the private 
provider. This might explain why we do not observe as many availability 
contracts in less developed countries as in developed countries, since the default 
risk of procuring authorities in such countries can be very high (γ  tends towards 
zero). However, as already highlighted, such a default risk can also occur in 
developed countries (e.g. when the procuring authority is a local entity) but the 
probability of occurrence is lower than in less developed countries.   
 
 
6   Discussion 
 
Overall, the model highlights that contracts in which the private provider does not 
bear the demand risk, even though they permit to reduce the likelihood of 
renegotiation – to the extent that low demand realizations are often at the heart of 
opportunistic renegotiations initiated by firms –, are not always optimal. In other 
words, I have pointed out that there is a tradeoff between using concession 
contracts to raise private providers’ and public authorities’ incentives to be 
responsive to consumers concerns, and resorting to availability contracts to limit 
the likelihood of renegotiation. Thus, this tradeoff will mainly depend on the 
following criteria: (a) the possibility for consumers to exercise pressure on private 
providers’ revenue, (b) the default risk, and (c) the likelihood of renegotiation.  
Taking into account these three criteria, it is possible to make some 
predictions on the contractual form that would best fit a particular sector.  
 
6.1   Speculation 
 
Let first consider the case of water supply. In such a case, the availability of 
alternative provisions for consumers is rather limited (they can however still buy 
bottles of water). Thus, procuring authorities cannot credibly threaten the 
incumbent private provider in side-trading it in case of default of adaptation of the 
service provision. Are availability contracts then better suited to this sector? The 
tradeoff will depend on the likelihood of renegotiation versus the likelihood of 
default of the procuring authority.  
For road projects, consumers have most often the choice between alternative 
provisions (e.g. trains, alternative roads), so that the impact of the consumers’ 
pressure on the private provider’s remuneration can be significant16. Concession 
contracts will therefore dominate availability contracts regarding the allocative 
efficiency. However, the quality of roads is largely contractible, so that we can 
expect a very low effect of cost-reducing investments on quality. The model 
                                                 
16 Again, and particularly in the road sector, a marginal variation in the demand can be sufficient to 
generate negative profits for the private provider. 
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highlights that when there is no effect of cost-reducing investments on quality, 
availability contracts always dominate concession contracts regarding the 
incentives of the private provider to cut costs. In addition, the uncertainty 
associated with future traffic is very high and exogenous (PICKRELL [1990], 
FLYVBJERG AND SKAMRIS [1997], ATHIAS AND NUNEZ [2008]), making 
toll road concessions particularly prone to renegotiation issues (ENGEL ET AL. 
[2002], [2006], GUASCH [2004], ESTACHE [2006]). A clear prediction in this 
sector is therefore not possible, but will tend to favour the use of availability 
contracts in this sector.  By contrast, we can expect that contracts in which the 
private provider bears the demand risk will be more suitable for the management 
of schools (included school catering services) and hospitals where there is a 
diversity of provisions and a low uncertainty on the future demand.  
These results are generally consistent with existing evidence on how PFI is 
working, compared to concession contracts. According to a report commissioned 
by the Treasury Taskforce (ARTHUR AND ANDERSEN AND ENTERPRISE 
LSE [2000]), PFI appears to have worked well for roads, generating substantial 
cost saving, though it has worked less well for schools and hospitals. 
 
6.2   A Continuum Choice of Contracts Rather Than Binary  
 
It is contractually possible to restrict the demand risk imposed on the private 
provider within a concession contract (ATHIAS AND SAUSSIER [2007]), so that 
public authorities do not face a binary choice of contracts but a continuum choice. 
However, this does not question the results I obtained to the extent that the 
weaker the extent to which the private provider bears the demand risk, the weaker 
the potential impact of the consumers’ pressure on its remuneration, i.e. the higher 
the λ, and hence the weaker the advantages to resort to concession contracts, 
everything else being equal.  
 
6.3   Voucher Provision, Transaction Costs and Political Accountability 
 
The model developed in this paper underpins the standard argument for voucher 
provision of public services. The state provides the citizens with a voucher that 
entitles the individual to a particular service (or it could be a monetary amount) 
and they then choose where to spend that voucher. A better matching between 
consumers and providers is therefore reached. This attenuates incentive problems 
and increases organizational efficiency by economizing on the need for explicit 
incentives. This can explain why the transaction costs of designing a contract in 
which the private provider bears the demand risk are much lower than those 
associated with the design of a contract in which the private provider does not 
bear the demand risk. 
This paper also addresses the broader question of how to increase the political 
accountability and more specifically if it is possible to increase the political 
accountability by empowering the consumers, i.e. by allowing them to oust a firm 
when this one bears the demand risk. I show that, in the particular case I analyze, 
the political accountability is higher when consumers are empowered. 
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6.4   Comparison with Public Provision  
 
While ELLMAN [2006] finds that it is always optimal to have in-house provision 
relative to contracting out provision regarding the political and public 
accountability, I show that under some conditions, the contracting-out model in 
which the private provider bears the demand risk might dominate the public 
provision since it allows political accountability as well as cost-reducing 
investments.  
 
 
7   Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have studied the effects of imposing the demand risk on the private 
provider on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers 
changing demands and on the adaptation effort incentives of the private public-
service provider. Thus, not only private providers, but also public authorities, can 
be expropriated ex post of a part of the surplus generated by their efforts to 
investigate and satisfy consumers’ changing demand. 
The model shows that the contract form in which the private provider bears 
the demand risk always dominates the one in which it does not bear the demand 
risk regarding the incentives given to procuring authorities and private providers 
to be responsive to consumers concerns.  
As for the incentives given to the private provider to reduce costs, there are 
cases (depending on the impact of consumers’ pressure on the private provider’s 
remuneration and on the functional forms of the positive and negative effects of 
the private provider’s cost-cutting efforts) where the contract form such as the 
concession contract does not dominate the contract form such as the availability 
contract. In such cases then, a tradeoff occurs between imposing the demand risk 
on the private provider to raise the accountability of procuring authorities, and not 
imposing the demand risk on the private provider to raise his cost-cutting 
incentives. Considering the potentiality of default of procuring authorities tends to 
make the concession contract be more often optimal than the availability contract, 
under certain conditions, regarding the cost-cutting incentives of the private 
provider.  
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it puts the emphasis on the 
political accountability, so far neglected, in the alignment on service provision 
preferences. It sheds some insights on the impact of the contractual design of 
Public Private Partnerships on this accountability mechanism and questions the 
trend towards the greater resort to contracts where firms bear little or no demand 
risk around the world. Second, it contributes to the broader literature on the 
political economy of government responsiveness. It is in fact related to the 
literature on voucher provision of public services and demonstrates that 
empowering consumers of public services strengthens incentives for governments 
to be responsive. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
  
The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
                              , or, equivalently, 2))((')2( =− λλ ivk . 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 0))((')('))(('')2( =−− λλλλ ikviivk  
Rearranging and solving for )(' λi :  
 
 
Since v  is concave as well as 10 ≤≤ λ  and 10 ≤< k , the denominator is always 
negative and the numerator is always positive. Therefore, )(' λi  is always 
negative.  
 
 
B. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
B.1. Proof of proposition 2 ii) 
 
The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
 
 
 
or, equivalently, 2)))((')1(2())((')1( =−−+ λλλλλ eqew . 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 
0)))((')42()('))(('')1(2())((')('))(('')1( =−−−−++ λλλλλλλλλλ eqeeqeweew . 
Rearranging and solving for )(' λe : 
  
 
 
Since w  is concave and q  is convex (as well as 10 ≤≤ λ ), the denominator is 
always negative. Since '' qw−  is always positive, the numerator is also always 
negative for            .  
 
Therefore, when            , )(' λe  is always positive.  
 
 
C. Proof of Proposition 5 
 
The first-order condition is   
 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to γ  yields 
 
k
iv λ−= 2
2)('
))(('')2(
))((')(' λλ
λλ
ivk
ikvi −=
1
2
)1(
)1(2)(')(' +=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−− λλ
λλeqew
))(('')1(2))(('')1(
))(('))((')42()(' λλλλλ
λλλλ
eqew
eweqe −−+
−−=
1))((' =γγ ew
0))((')('))(('' =+ γγγγ eweew
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4
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Rearranging and solving for )(' γe : 
  
 
Since w  is concave, the denominator and the numerator are also always negative. 
Therefore, )(' γe  is always positive.  
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